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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

;

vs.

])
(

DIANE DUNN,

(;

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF
OF THE APPELLANT
Case No. 20030573-CA

(

REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE RECKLESS DRIVING STATUTE EXPRESSLY
INCLUDES ALL MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS INCLUDING
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.
The Appellee answers Ms. Dunn's assertions of error by employing
result-oriented reasoning which extends beyond the plain language of the
statute to presume the legislature's intent. Appellee urges that "[t]he
legislature obviously did not intend for DUI and other more serious offenses
to be reduced to Reckless Driving." Brief of Appellee at 9 (emphasis
added). Regardless of what one presumes the legislature desired or had in
mind in writing the statute, due process and long standing rules of statutory
construction confine that an analysis be conducted of the language
articulated in the statute in question.
1

In her opening brief Ms. Dunn documented these appropriate rules of
statutory construction. The plain language contained within a statute is to
be interpreted as the intent of the statute unless an ambiguity exists within
the language itself. See Brief of Appellant at 8-12.
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will
not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are
guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed
according to its plain language. ... When language is clear and
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room
is left for construction.
Brendlev. City of Draper. 937 P.2d 1044,1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(quotations and citations omitted).
In a recent case involving the meaning of a statute, the Utah Supreme
Court echoed this ruling stating the following:
In considering the meaning of a [statutory] provision, the
analysis begins with the plain language of the provision. . .. We need
not look beyond the plain language unless we find some ambiguity in
it. Moreover, [t]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole,
and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the
same statute and with other statutes under the same and related
chapters.
State v. MacGuire. 2004 UT 4, |15 (citations omitted).
Despite the protestations of the State, no ambiguity exists in the plain
language of the Reckless Driving Statute. The Reckless Driving statute
reads:
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty.

2

(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle:
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property;
or
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under
Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts
within a single continuous period of driving.
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2000)(emphasis added). Ms. Dunn insists that
the language in 41-6-45(1 )(b) is so plain on its face that any and all moving
traffic violations as pronounced by the legislature in Title 41, Chapter 6 are
expressly adopted as potential elements of the (l)(b) violation if committed
in a series of violations with two others.

The State says that the DUI

statute is somehow exempted from this plain reading of the statute despite
conceding that DUI is a moving traffic violation that falls under Title 41,
Chapter 6, of the Traffic Rules and Regulations section of the code. Brief
of Appellee at 6.
In short, the State disagrees with the plain meaning encouraged by
Ms. Dunn because it does not like the result. For example, the State does
not cite to any specific language within the statute which is somehow or in
some way ambiguous. Each of the result-oriented interpretations by the
State requires this Court to reach beyond the plain language of the
legislature and contort a different meaning. None of the interpretations of
the State are justified first, because the language is unambiguous thereby
forbidding any new construction of the plain language; and second, the State

3

fails to provide any extended analysis, historic or otherwise, which supports
its position other than to impermissibly rewrite the statute and claim disdain
for the result. Likewise, State v. Hernandez. 2003 UT App 276, relied on
by the State, fails to address the statutory argument at all. By its plain
language the DUI statute is an included part of the Reckless Driving statute
provided the other two requisite traffic violations are present as exist in this
case.
Appellee pleads that the DUI statute and the Reckless Driving statute
address wholly distinctive behaviors. Brief of Appellee at 10. Notably, the
same can be said for Speeding (§ 41-6-46), Failure to Signal (§ 41-6-71) and
any other traffic offense listed within the section. The argument is
unhelpful because the plain language of the Reckless Driving statute
expressly and unambiguously incorporates every traffic matter within Title
41 and Chapter 6 of the Utah Code regardless of their distinctive behavior.
It is a very simple matter for the legislature to exclude or exempt a particular
traffic violation, if desired, from being included by spelling out the particular
exempt violation. Numerous occurrences of such exemptions or exclusions
exist in our code. See, e.g. § 76-5-404.1 and § 76-9-702.5, both statutes are
examples of the legislature's ability and prior usage of expressly excluding
or exempting more serious charges from a less serious charge. Therefore,
had the legislature intended any traffic violation to be exempt from the
Reckless Driving claim it could and would have said it was excluded.

4

The State says, "The defendant fails to explain how eliminating
prosecutions under Utah's DUI statute would achieve securing the public's
safety." Brief of Appellee at 9. Neither Ms. Dunn nor this Court is
required to address this contention of the state. The legislature wrote the
statute and if the inarguably plain meaning is something other than that
which is desired, then the legislature can rewrite the statute as is their
prerogative. As discussed in Ms. Dunn' opening brief, our Utah Supreme
Court has addressed this very issue in a Shondel analysis in 1985. There the
Court stated:
This Court does not declare statutes unenforceable or unconstitutional
because they could have been better drafted; indeed it has long been
the law that we attempt to construe statutes to be constitutional. Nor
are we concerned with legislative policy decisions embodied in
statutes. Nevertheless, we cannot disregard our responsibility to
assure the rational and evenhanded application of the criminal laws.
Equal protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all those who
are similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written
so that there are significant differences between offenses and so that
the exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties depending
under which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge.
That would be a form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of
law. The Legislature may make automobile homicide committed
recklessly either a misdemeanor or a felony, but it cannot make the
crime both a felony and a misdemeanor, leaving the choice to the
prosecutor as to whether he charges a felony or a misdemeanor.
State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 257, 263 (citations omitted).
This Court should resist the result-oriented interpretations provided by
the State to affirm the trial court's erroneous decision, undoubtedly equally
5

motivated by the same desire to read a contrary result into an otherwise
clearly articulated statute. This Court should reverse and remand the Dunn
matter to the lower court to enter a sentence on the Reckless Driving
violation as clearly indicated in the statute.

POINT II. THE SHONDEL LINE OF CASES REQUIRE THAT MS.
DUNN'S CONVICTION BE ENTERED FOR THE CRIME OF
RECKLESS DRIVING.
The State of Utah claims that State v. Shondel 435 P.2d 146 (Utah
1969), and its progeny do not apply because the traffic offenses of Reckless
Driving and DUI have different elements.

A review of both statutes prior

to the 2000 amendment would likely support the claim of the state.
However, this claim inarguably fails when applied to the current language of
§ 41-6-45(l)(b). Again, the statute now reads as follows:
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty.
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle:
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property;
or
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under
Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts
within a single continuous period of driving.
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2000)(emphasis added).

In section (l)(b) the

legislature has expressly made each and every moving violation in Title 41,

6

Chapter 6, as a crime and element of reckless driving.1 Once any three of
those offenses are established then the three offenses merge together to
create a reckless driving charge. As indicated above, DUI is not exempted
from this statute. The State's argument refuses to recognize that the DUI
statute, in its entirety, is an included offense just as are all other traffic
offenses from Title 41, Chapter 6. Their position to the contrary is without
merit and ignores the plain language of the statute and how each traffic
offense with all its corresponding elements merge into the Reckless Driving
under (l)(b).
The State also claims that Shondel does not apply because the
legislature did not intend that all traffic violations be merged into the
Reckless Driving statute. Brief of Appellee at 12. This argument is wholly
circular and in error. For reasons stated above, where no ambiguity exists
and no exclusions or exemptions are expressed, then due process and the
Shondel line of authority dictates that the discretion of the prosecutor to
choose which statute applies is removed and the penalty of the lesser is
appropriately assigned.

1

The State of Utah concedes that DUI is a moving traffic violation within
41-6. Brief of Appellee at 6.
7

Because DUI is an element of the new reckless driving offense of
subsection (l)(b) Shondel most certainly applies and the lower punishment
of a B misdemeanor necessarily applies.

POINT III. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The State complains that oral argument would not significantly aid the
Court in deciding the case. Ms. Dunn disagrees. Rule 29 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure delineates that "oral argument will be allowed in all
cases unless the court concludes: the appeal is frivolous, the issue has
recently been authoritatively decided, or that the decisional process would
not be significantly aided by the oral argument." Oral argument can help to
clarify the positions of the parties that are only briefly provided to the Court
in these pleadings.
Ms. Dunn respectfully requests the opportunity to address the Court
and believes oral argument unquestionably will aide the decisional process.

CONCLUSION
Appellant DIANE DUNN respectfully requests that this Court to
review the statutory construction issues and separate Shondel argument
presented herein, and for all or any of the reasons stated, to correct the
8

decision of the trial court and reverse the conviction for Driving Under the
Influence and remand the matter for a new sentencing for the corrected
offense of Reckless Driving.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i ^ d a y of February, 2004.

BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON
Attorney for Appellant
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